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OHIO VALLEY ENVTL. COAL., INC. V. UNITED STATES ARMY
CORPS OF ENGINEERS: FINE TUNING THE SCOPE
OF THE CORPS’ JURISDICTION
I. INTRODUCTION
Surface coal mining, otherwise known as mountaintop removal, has been an increasingly popular choice for resource extraction among coal companies in the Appalachia region since the
early 1970s.1 While surface coal mining has increased in popularity, it has also become the most controversial form of coal mining.2
The process involves “clear-cut[ting]” forested summits, “strip[ing]
[them] of topsoil,” and “blast[ing] away [ ] [up] to [one thousand]
vertical feet of rock[ ]” to reach underlying seams of coal.3 “The
leftover rubble, . . . [or] overburden[,] is pushed into the surrounding valleys,” which typically contain ephemeral headwater streams.4
In some cases, the mining itself takes place through the headwater
streams.5
In either case, the industrial coal mining activity in and around
the jurisdictional waters of the United States, which occurs in most
surface mining operations, invokes the jurisdiction of the Army
Corps of Engineers (Corps), as well as that of federally-approved
state regulatory agencies, such as the West Virginia Department of
Environmental Protection (WVDEP).6 Part III of this Note discusses the statutory schemes that regulate coal mining activities and
1. See Allison Subacz, Mountaintop Removal: Case Studies and Legislative Update of
the Permitting Process, 4 APPALACHIAN NAT. RESOURCES L.J. 49, 51 (2010) (describing
background of surface coal mining generally).
2. See id. (citing U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Mid-Atlantic
Mountaintop Mining, http://www.epa.gov/region03/mtntop/index.htm (last updated Oct. 11, 2016)) (discussing controversial nature of surface coal mining).
3. See Emily Sangi, Equating Stream Structure with Function: The Fourth Circuit’s
Misstep in Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition v. Aracoma Coal Co., 37 ECOLOGY L.Q.
701, 701-02 (2010) (citing Earthjustice, Earthjustice Seeks Supreme Court Review in
Mountaintop Removal Mining Case (Aug. 27, 2009), http://earthjustice.org/news/
press/2009/earthjustice-seeks-supreme-court-review-in-mountaintop-removal-min
ing-case) (describing surface coal mining process).
4. See id. at 702 (citing Bragg v. W. Va. Coal Ass’n, 248 F.3d 275, 286 (S.D.W.
Va. 1999)) (citing Bragg v. Robertson, 72 F. Supp. 2d 642, 661-62 (S.D.W. Va.
1999)) (describing surface coal mining process and overburden treatment).
5. See generally Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal., Inc. v. United States Army Corps of
Eng’rs, 828 F.3d 316, 323 (4th Cir. 2016) (deciding case where mining activities
took place through streams).
6. See Sangi, supra note 3, at 702-03 (describing regulation of coal mining).
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the interplay between state and federal regulatory agencies that perform oversight of coal mining activities.7 In addition, part III will
provide a comprehensive overview of the key statutes and regulatory permits that govern the surface coal mining process and will
give a glimpse into their various judicial interpretations.8 Parts II
and IV of this Note will provide the facts and analysis of the Fourth
Circuit’s recent decision in Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition, Inc.
v. United States Army Corps of Engineers (OVEC, Inc.),9 where the
Court interpreted the scope of the Corps’ jurisdiction in relation to
surface coal mining.10 The impact section of this Note will present
possible theories of the effect that the Fourth Circuit’s recent decision in OVEC, Inc. will have in the coal mining context, as well as in
other areas in which the Corps’ jurisdiction can be invoked.11
II. FACTS
Raven Crest Contracting, LLC (Raven Crest) operated the
Boone North No. 5 Surface Mine in West Virginia for the purpose
of extracting “‘approximately 6.8 [million] tons of . . . bituminous
coal’ from a 724-acre area.”12 In order to carry out its planned operations, federal law required Raven Crest to obtain permits under
“four federal regulatory provisions: the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1977 ([ ]SMCRA[ ]) . . . and sections 401, 402,
and 404 of the Clean Water Act[ ] [(CWA)].”13 West Virginia’s
state environmental regulatory agency, the WVDEP, was required to
issue the SMCRA permit and the permits under sections 401 and
402 of the CWA under a “cooperative-federalism approach,” under
which WVDEP complies with minimum federal requirements in its
permitting process, while the Corps was required to issue the sec7. For a discussion of the statutory schemes regulating surface coal mining,
see infra notes 27-57 and accompanying text.
8. For a discussion of the statutory schemes regulating coal mining and the
corresponding historical judicial interpretations, see infra notes 27-91 and accompanying text.
9. 828 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 2016).
10. Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal., Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Engineers,
828 F.3d 316, 318 (4th Cir. 2016) (reviewing scope of Corps’ jurisdiction). For a
discussion of OVEC, Inc.’s facts, see infra notes 12-26 and accompanying text. Additionally, for an analysis of the court’s holding in OVEC, Inc., see infra notes 108-166
and accompanying text.
11. For a discussion of the potential impact of OVEC, Inc.’s holding, see infra
notes 167-183 and accompanying text.
12. OVEC, Inc., 828 F.3d at 318 (alteration in original) (quoting J.A. 93) (explaining factual background of case).
13. See id. (citations omitted) (explaining background of case).
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tion 404 permit under the CWA.14 Between 2009 and 2011, Raven
Crest applied for, and WVDEP issued, the SMCRA and CWA sections 401 and 402 permits.15
“Because the Corps[,] [ ] a federal agency,” must issue the
CWA section 404 permit, “[the Corps’] review of a [S]ection 404
permit application must also comply with [the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)],” requiring federal agencies to report
certain environmental findings prior to taking any major federal
action, such as issuing permits.16 NEPA “requires [federal] agencies to produce an environmental impact statement ([ ]EIS[ ])
before undertaking any ‘major Federal action[ ] significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.’”17 An EIS is not required, however, if the agency finds the action will have “no
significant impact” after preparing an Environmental Assessment.18
Raven Crest submitted a Section 404 permit application to the
Corps in 2009.19 The Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition, Inc.
(OVEC), a consortium of environmental groups, submitted a letter
during the public comment period, “express[ing] [ ] concern[s]
that ‘[v]arious studies have shown that coal mining has significant
impacts on the health of those living in the coal fields[.]’”20 OVEC
argued that “[t]hese impacts must be considered by the Corps during the permitting process.”21 In 2012, “the Corps issued [its]
[p]ermit [e]valuation and [d]ecision [d]ocument[,] [ ] include[ing] . . . [its] [Environmental Assessment that NEPA required], and [concluded that] grant[ing] Raven Crest’s . . . permit
14. See id. at 319-20 (explaining state and federal permitting process for surface mines). The SMCRA grants each state that meets minimum regulatory requirements exclusive jurisdiction over the regulation of surface coal mining within
the state’s borders. Id. at 318. The West Virginia Department of Environmental
Protection (WVDEP) administers West Virginia’s regulation. Id. WVDEP also
cooperates with the Environmental Protection Agency to ensure that any discharge
from mines within the state will comply with all applicable water quality standards
and requirements under the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System. Id.
15. Id. at 319-20 (describing Raven Crest’s permitting procedure for Boone
North No. 5 mine).
16. OVEC, Inc., 828 F.3d at 320 (describing requirements for section 404 permit application review).
17. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332(C) (1975))
(describing federal law requirements on Corps review of section 404 permits).
18. Id. (describing federal law requirements surrounding issuance of EIS
under CWA).
19. Id. (describing factual background of Raven Crest’s permitting
procedure).
20. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting J.A. 204) (explaining OVEC’s environmental concerns with Raven Crest’s proposal).
21. OVEC, Inc., 828 F.3d at 320 (alteration in original) (quoting J.A. 204) (discussing Raven Crest’s section 404 application).
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. . . . would ‘not have a significant impact on the quality of the
human environment[;]’ and [ ] therefore[,] the Corps did not
need to prepare an EIS.”22 Because the Corps concluded that “the
issues . . . raised regarding the relationship between surface coal
mining and public health ‘are not within the purview of the Corp’s
regulatory authority, but are considered by WVDEP during the SMCRA permitting process[,]’” the Corps did not consider OVEC’s
study in granting Raven Crest’s section 404 permit.23
OVEC brought suit under the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA), seeking to either “suspen[d] or revo[ke] [ ] Raven Crest’s
section 404 permit, claiming that the Corps’ decision not to consider those studies violated both NEPA and section 404 [of the
CWA].”24 The District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia granted summary judgment in favor of Raven Crest and the
Corps, and OVEC subsequently appealed.25 Upon review, the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s
holding, finding that the Corps neither violated NEPA nor the
CWA, and that the relevant provisions of NEPA and the CWA did
not “create an obligation for the Corps to study the effects of activities beyond the proposed [mining activities]” for which the applicant sought a permit.26
III. BACKGROUND
A. Surface Mine Permitting Requirements
Surface coal mining, the practice of removing mountaintop
overburden to expose and extract the underlying coal seam, requires four environmental permits.27 Both state and federal environmental agencies must analyze the surface mining operations to
ensure that the operations will not have a significant impact on
human health and water quality.28 The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), or an EPA-approved state agency, is
22. Id. (quoting J.A. 582-83) (discussing Corps’ grant of Raven Crest’s section
404 permit).
23. Id. at 321 (alteration in original) (quoting J.A. 642) (discussing Raven
Crest’s section 404 application).
24. Id. (footnote omitted) (discussing OVEC’s complaint).
25. Id. (discussing district court’s ruling and OVEC’s appeal).
26. OVEC, Inc., 828 F.3d at 323-24 (finding in favor of Raven Crest and
Corps).
27. Sangi, supra note 3, at 701-03 (discussing permit requirements for surface
coal mine operations).
28. See generally id. at 702-03 (outlining surface mine permitting process); see
also OVEC, Inc., 828 F.3d at 318-21 (discussing surface mine permitting process and
cooperation between state and federal regulatory agencies).
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tasked with analyzing both the proposed mining activities generally
and their potential effect on water quality before issuing any permits and certifications.29 The Corps is tasked with analyzing the
surface mine’s proposed use of “valley[-]fill” techniques, which temporarily dispose of excess overburden from the mining operation in
the neighboring valleys.30
1. SMCRA Permit
In order to engage in surface mining, an applicant must obtain
a surface coal mining permit that an EPA-approved state regulatory
agency issued under the SMCRA.31 The state regulatory agency,
specifically, WVDEP in West Virginia, requires the applicant to
“provide detailed information about possible environmental consequences of the proposed operations, as well as assurances that damage to the site will be prevented or minimized during mining and
substantially repaired after mining has come to an end.”32 In most
states, an EPA-approved state department of environmental protection has exclusive jurisdiction to authorize surface coal mining
under the SMCRA.33
2. CWA Section 401 Certification
An applicant must also obtain a section 401 certification that
the EPA, or EPA-approved state regulatory agency, issues, representing that the applicant’s proposed activities, including any discharge from the mine site, will not cause a violation of the state’s
water quality standards.34 The CWA requires that the state water
quality standards be “sufficiently stringent to protect public
29. See generally OVEC, Inc., 828 F.3d at 318 (elaborating on surface mine permitting process).
30. See id. at 319-21 (discussing CWA section 404 permit and Corps’ jurisdiction); see also Sam Evans, Voices from the Desecrated Places: A Journey to End
Mountaintop Removal Mining, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 521, 539-40 (2010) (analyzing Corps’ jurisdiction over section 404 permits for discharge of dredged or fill
material).
31. OVEC, Inc., 828 F.3d at 318-20 (citing Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Aracoma
Coal Co., 556 F.3d 117, 189 (4th Cir. 2009)) (describing SMCRA permit
application).
32. Id. at 318-19 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ohio Valley
Envtl. Coal. v. Aracoma Coal Co., 556 F.3d 117, 196 (4th Cir. 2009)) (discussing
permitting process); see also 30 U.S.C. §§ 1256-57, 1265 (1977) (providing state and
federal statutory scheme for coal mining regulations).
33. OVEC, Inc., 828 F.3d at 322-23 (discussing WVDEP’s exclusive jurisdiction
under SMCRA).
34. Id. at 319 (quoting Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Aracoma Coal Co., 556 F.3d
117, 190 (4th Cir. 2009)) (noting CWA section 401 certification must comply with
minimum EPA water quality standards).
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health[ ]” as the EPA designates.35 A section 401 certification is a
prerequisite for the valid obtainment of any “other ‘Federal license
or permit to conduct any activity . . . which may result in any discharge’ into waters of the United States[.]”36
3. CWA Sections 402 and 404 Permits
An applicant seeking to operate a surface coal mine, which will
involve massive earth-moving activities and undoubtedly lead to the
discharge of pollutants into U.S. waters, must obtain a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit through the
EPA or the state’s EPA-approved regulatory agency that has administered its own NPDES permitting program.37 One of Congress’
primary goals in requiring an NPDES permit was to prevent “[t]he
use of any river, lake, stream or ocean as a waste treatment system”
and to “eliminat[e] ‘the discharge of pollutants’ into federally regulated waters[.]”38 Under a section 402 NPDES permit, the applicant’s proposed discharge must not violate state water quality
standards.39 Some pollutants that are prohibited from discharge
into U.S. waters that may be of interest to the prospective surface
coal mine operator include, among others, dredged spoil, rock,
and sand.40
Most surface coal mining operations involve mine-through and
backfill activities in and around stream channels, which involve discharging rock, sand, and other fill materials into U.S. waters in violation of the water quality standards that the CWA sets forth.41 Not
all discharges, however, are included in the CWA’s prohibitions on
pollutant discharges into the federally regulated U.S. waters.42 An
35. OVEC, Inc., 828 F.3d at 319 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c) (2000)) (describing cooperative-federalism between state agencies and EPA for water quality
regulation).
36. Id. (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a) (1977)) (noting importance of CWA section 401 certification).
37. Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2014)) (outlining CWA section 402 permit);
see also Evans, supra note 30, at 539 (discussing EPA’s jurisdiction over CWA section
402 NPDES permits).
38. See Evans, supra note 30, at 544 (alteration in original) (quoting 33 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a)(1) (2006)) (quoting S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 7 (1971)) (discussing CWA
drafter’s intent and stated goals).
39. See id. at 546 (discussing CWA section 402 NPDES permit requirements in
context of storm water discharges associated with construction activities).
40. See id. at 545 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (2014)) (discussing relevant
pollutants as defined under CWA).
41. See OVEC, Inc., 828 F.3d at 319 (discussing surface coal mines’ operations
and needs for section 404 dredge and fill permit).
42. See Evans, supra note 30, at 544-45 (discussing “fill” exception to CWA’s
general prohibition on discharges).
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applicant may be excused from the CWA’s stringent water quality
standards and permitted to discharge “dredged [and] fill material
into [U.S.] waters[,]” subject to guidelines of minimization and mitigation required under a section 404 permit.43
B. Historical Background of the CWA and Section 404
Congress enacted the CWA “to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”44 The
CWA’s overall goal was to eliminate the use of the nation’s waters as
a means for waste treatment.45 Congress recognized the need, however, for construction, development, and industrial activities in and
around U.S. waters; consequently, it included a permitting process
under section 404 to allow for the discharge of dredged and fill
material related to those activities in order to avoid “stifl[ing]
[these] beneficial activities” under the stringent water quality requirements.46 While the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of
1899 (RHA), the predecessor of the CWA, made a clear distinction
between dredging and filling materials and “refuse” or waste materials, the CWA makes no such distinction, nor does it explicitly define what is included as “fill” under the section 404 permit.47 It is
clear that valley-fill type surface mining operations would violate
the water quality standards of the NPDES permit; thus, surface coal
mine operators have sought relief under the section 404 exception
to carry out their operations.48 “[T]he Corps may issue a permit
[under section 404], notwithstanding the fact that it may cause a
violation of water quality standards, if the permittee agrees to avoid
and minimize stream impacts to the extent practicable[,] [ ]taking
into account the cost of alternatives that would satisfy the project’s
purpose[ ][,]” and to mitigate the damage.49
43. OVEC, Inc., 828 F.3d at 319 (discussing need for CWA section 404 dredge
and fill permit); see also Evans, supra note 30, at 544 (discussing “discharge and fill”
material permit exception to CWA section 402 permit).
44. Evans, supra note 30, at 544 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006)) (stating
purpose of CWA).
45. See id. (discussing CWA history and section 404 dredge and fill permit).
46. See id. (explaining CWA permitting history and significance of statutory
language).
47. See id. at 543-45 (discussing fill as defined under RHA and CWA).
48. See id. at 540 (noting that surface coal mining operations currently permitted under section 404 would be prohibited under section 402); see also Browand,
infra note 50, at 633-37 (analyzing coal companies’ fight to be regulated under
section 404 instead of section 402).
49. Evans, supra note 30, at 539 (citing 33 C.F.R. §§ 332.1(c)(2), 332.3(a)
(2008)) (describing section 404 permit requirements).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2017

7

Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 28, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 4

266 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVIII: p. 259
C. Defining “Fill” Under the CWA
Both the EPA and the Corps initially defined the term “fill”
under the CWA expansively to include “any pollutant used to create
fill in the traditional sense of . . . changing the bottom elevation of
a water body for any purpose.”50 In 1977, in an attempt to more
clearly define the boundaries between section 402 waste regulation
and section 404 fill regulation, the Corps changed its definition of
fill material to reflect a “primary purpose” test.51 The Corps’ new
primary purpose test redefined fill material “to mean ‘any material
used for the primary purpose of replacing an aquatic area with dry
land or of changing the bottom elevation of a waterbody.’”52 The
Corps excluded “any pollutant discharged into the water primarily
to dispose of waste, as that activity is regulated under Section 402
[of the CWA].”53
In 1999, in Bragg v. Robertson,54 “the District Court for the
Southern District of West Virginia . . . held . . . that coal mining
waste was not ‘fill’ under the Corps’ purpose-based [definition],”
which removed coal mining activities from the protection of the
Corps’ permit.55 In response, the EPA and the Corps abandoned
the purpose-based test for defining fill materials, and instead, implemented an effects-based test.56 The new rule specifically includes “overburden from mining or other excavation activities[ ]”
in its definition of fill material that is subject to a section 404 permit
exception under the CWA.57
D. Judicial Interpretations of Agency Rules
Various environmental groups have challenged the Corps’
practice of issuing section 404 “dredge and fill” permits to construc50. Nathaniel Browand, Note, Shifting the Boundary Between the Sections 402 and
404 Permitting Programs by Expanding the Definition of Fill Material, 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF.
L. REV. 617, 624 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 33 C.F.R. §
209.120(d)(6) (1976)) (discussing historical agency interpretations of CWA).
51. See id. at 625 (explaining Corps rule changes under CWA).
52. Id. (quoting 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(e) (2001)) (explaining Corps’ new primary
purpose test for fill material).
53. Id. (quoting 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(e) (2001)) (stating Corps new definition of
fill material under 1977 rule changes to CWA).
54. 72 F. Supp. 2d 624 (S.D.W. Va. 1999).
55. See Evans, supra note 30, at 541-42 (citing Bragg v. Robertson, 72 F. Supp.
2d 624, 656-57, 663 (S.D. W. Va. 1999)) (discussing West Virginia district court
opinion that found mining waste was not “fill”).
56. See id. (noting EPA and Corps rule change in response to Bragg decision).
57. Id. at 542 (quoting 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(e) (2009)) (highlighting new regulation’s inclusion of mining overburden in fill materials that fall under section 404
permit).
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tion and mining operations prior to, during, and after the Corps
adopted the effects-based test for determining what constitutes fill
material.58 Prior to the rule change, environmental groups attacked the validity of section 404 permits based on the Corps’ definition of fill materials.59 Courts typically found that the fill
materials from mining operations were waste materials and, therefore, did not fall under a section 404 permit.60 After the rule
change, however, the more recent trend has shown courts interpreting cases favorably in response to coal companies’ needs for an
exception to the stringent water quality requirements of section
402.61
Environmental groups cut their losses under the “fill material”
approach after appellate courts showed adherence to the Corps’
new regulations.62 The only option left for environmental activists
was to attack the sufficiency of the Corps’ review of the section 404
application, as NEPA and the CWA required.63 Environmental
58. See generally OVEC, Inc., 828 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 2016); Kentuckians for
Commw. v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 746 F.3d 698 (6th Cir. 2014);
Friends of Back Bay v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 681 F.3d 581 (4th Cir.
2012); Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Aracoma Coal Co., 556 F.3d 177 (4th Cir. 2009);
Bragg v. Robertson, 7 F. Supp. 2d 624 (S.D.W. Va. 1999) (hearing challenges to
Corps’ issuance of section 404 permits in various contexts).
59. See Browand, supra note 50, at 633-35 (analyzing cases challenging section
404 permits on definition of “fill material”).
60. See id. (discussing district court’s view that mining overburden and spoil
not considered “fill material” for purposes of section 404 permit). In a 1989 decision, the District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia concluded that
the EPA had the authority to prohibit coal mining fill activities because the activities would involve discharging waste into federally regulated U.S. waters in violation of section 402 under the CWA. See W. Va. Coal Ass’n v. Reilly, 728 F.Supp.
1276, 1293 (S.D.W. Va. 1989) (concluding EPA had jurisdiction to prohibit dredge
and fill activities as coal mine waste). Citing to Reilly for support, the District Court
for the District of New Mexico similarly held that the EPA had jurisdiction to prohibit the dumping of gold-mine overburden because such overburden constituted
waste. See Friends of Santa Fe Cty. v. LAC Minerals, Inc., 892 F. Supp. 1333, 134243 (D.N.M. 1995) (holding EPA had jurisdiction to prohibit gold-mine overburden
as waste).
61. Browand, supra note 50, at 635 (discussing recent cases illustrating presumption in favor of Corps’ jurisdiction over valley-fill permitting).
62. See generally Friends of Back Bay, 681 F.3d at 583; Aracoma, 556 F.3d at 187-88
(analyzing plaintiffs attack on Corps environmental review of section 404 permit
applications in various contexts). Appellate courts began to reject district courts’
treatment of coal mining overburden as waste and, instead, decided that overburden was properly categorized as fill material and therefore subject to the Corps’
section 404 permitting process. See Aracoma, 556 F.3d at 187-88; Friends of Back Bay,
681 F.3d at 583 (overturning district court decisions regarding categorization of fill
material and discussing Corps’ section 404 jurisdiction in construction context).
63. See generally Kentuckians, 746 F.3d at 701; Friends of Back Bay, 681 F.3d at
583; Aracoma, 556 F.3d at 187-88; (analyzing plaintiff’s attack on Corps environmental review of section 404 permit applications in various contexts).
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groups asserted, in various construction and mining contexts, that
the Corps’ review of the environmental impacts of the proposed
projects was insufficient to meet the requirements NEPA and the
CWA set out.64
E. Attacks on the Corps’ Environmental Review Process
In Ohio Valley Entl. Coal. v. Aracoma Coal Co. (Aracoma),65 the
plaintiff, a consortium of environmental organizations, brought an
action against the Corps, challenging the validity of four section
404 permits issued by the Corps to various coal companies.66
“[The] permits authorize[d] the creation of [twenty-three] valley
fills and [ ] sediment ponds[ ]” impacting just over thirteen miles
of intermittent and ephemeral streams.67 For each of the four permits, the Corps conducted Environmental Assessments, concluding
“that the permitted activity would not result in significant environmental impacts given planned mitigation measures.”68 The environmental groups claimed that the Corps “violated [ ] substantive
and procedural provisions of [ ] [NEPA] and the [CWA]” because
it failed to prepare an EIS.69 The groups claimed that an EIS was
required “given the significant individual and cumulative adverse
effects the projects would have on water quality, aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems and habitats, species survival and diversity, crucial
stream functions, forests, and the aesthetic value of the destroyed
mountains.”70
64. See generally Friends of Back Bay, 681 F.3d at 583; Aracoma, 556 F.3d at 187-88
(outlining plaintiff’s attack on Corps environmental review of section 404 permit
applications in various contexts). In Aracoma, the Fourth Circuit overturned the
District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia’s decision to treat coal
mining overburden as waste and concluded that the overburden was properly categorized as fill and subject to the Corps’ section 404 permitting process. See
Aracoma, 556 F.3d at 187-88 (overturning district court decision). Although Friends
of Back Bay focused on the sufficiency of the Corps’ environmental review, the case
illustrates a different example in which the Corps’ authority under section 404
relating to dredge and fill activities can arise. See Friends of Back Bay, 681 F.3d at
583 (discussing applicability of section 404 permit in boating and mooring-facility
construction project).
65. Aracoma, 556 F.3d at 187-88 (stating plaintiff’s claim against Corps under
APA).
66. Id. (explaining plaintiff’s challenges to permit validity on appeal).
67. Id. at 187 (stating scope of valley-fill project).
68. Id. (describing Corps’ findings and grant of permits).
69. Id. at 187-88 (describing OVEC’s claims against Corps for violation of
NEPA and CWA).
70. Aracoma, 556 F.3d at 187-88 (describing plaintiff’s argument that NEPA
required EIS). The district court found “that the probable impacts of the valley
fills would be significant and adverse under both the CWA and NEPA[,] that the
[proposed] mitigation plans . . . were [ ] [in]sufficient[,] . . . that[ ] . . . the Corps
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The District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia
found that the Corps violated NEPA and the CWA by limiting the
scope of its environmental review to only the projects’ impacts on
U.S. waters, rather than limiting the scope of its environmental review to the projects’ impact of the entire valley fill project.71 The
Corps appealed the district court’s ruling and argued that it was
“entitled to deference on its determination” of the required scope
of review and on its findings on “individual and cumulative impacts
and mitigation[.]”72 In response, the environmental groups argued
that the Corps’ NEPA analysis must consider all environmental impacts caused by the fill project as a whole.73 The Corps’ counterargument on appeal was that its interpretation of its own
regulations on the limited scope of review was reasonable and entitled to deference.74
“NEPA requires federal agencies to take a ‘hard look’ at the
environmental consequences of their actions,” but it does not provide guidance on how the scope of environmental review should be
determined.75 The Corps’ regulations, however, state that “the
proper scope of analysis for NEPA review is ‘to address the impacts
of the specific activity requiring a . . . permit and those portions of
the entire project over which the [Corps] district engineer has sufficient control and responsibility to warrant Federal review.’”76
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit focused its decision on the “specific activity” language found in the Corps’ regulations.77 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit also pointed to
section 404 of the CWA itself, which authorizes the Corps to issue
permits “for the discharge of dredged or fill material into the navi[is required] . . . under NEPA to look [ ] at the [broader] impact . . . of the entire
valley fill project[,] and[ ] . . . that the Corps inadequately evaluated the cumulative impacts of the projects.” Id. at 188.
71. Id. at 188 (discussing district court findings of Corps’ violations).
72. Id. (stating Corps’ deference arguments on appeal).
73. Id. at 193 (stating plaintiff’s arguments on appeal).
74. Id. at 188-89 (stating Corps’ counter-arguments on appeal). The Corps
has also argued that it is entitled to deference in interpreting section 404 based on
the Chevron doctrine in other contexts. See Bradford C. Mank, American Mining
Congress v. Army Corps of Engineers: Ignoring Chevron and the Clean Water Act’s Broad
Purposes, 25 N. KY. L. REV. 51, 57-58 (1997) (explaining Corp’s Chevron arguments).
75. Aracoma, 556 F.3d at 194 (quoting Wetlands Action Network v. United
States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 222 F.3d 1105, 1115 (9th Cir. 2000)) (providing
NEPA requirements on Corps’ scope of environmental review).
76. Id. at 194 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting 33 C.F.R. pt.
325, App. B, § 7(b)(1) (2008)) (noting Corps’ regulations on scope of NEPA
review).
77. See id. (discussing court’s reasoning for evaluating scope of activity).
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gable waters[.]”78 The court found that the “specific activity[,]” for
which the Corps issued a section 404 permit in these instances, was
“nothing more than the filling of jurisdictional waters for the purpose of creating an underdrain system for the larger valley fill.”79
The Corps did not have jurisdiction to prevent the larger valley-fill
project because such fill placement was outside of U.S. waters, and,
according to the court, was subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of
WVDEP as provided for under the SMCRA.80
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit then addressed
the possibility that the Corps had jurisdiction over the entire valleyfill project because it was a larger project that encompassed the specific activity over which the Corps has “sufficient control and responsibility to warrant Federal review.”81 The Corps’ regulations
state that these are cases “where the environmental consequences
of the larger project are essentially products of the Corps[‘] permit
action.”82 The environmental group contended that the overall valley-fill project must have been within the scope of the Corps’ NEPA
jurisdiction and review because the project would not be possible
without the section 404 permit for the underdrain system.83 The
court found that the environmental groups’ arguments warranted
consideration because their arguments had intuitive appeal.84 The
court, however, ultimately concluded that requiring the Corps to
review the entire project would create duplicative agency action,
given that WVDEP already had jurisdiction to review the environmental impacts of the proposed mining operations as a whole.85
Under the SMCRA, “the WVDEP surface mine permitting process examines ‘[e]very detail of the manner in which a coal mining
operation is to be conducted . . . includ[ing] the plan for the dispo78. Id. (emphasis in original removed) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2000)) (providing arguments in favor of limited
scope of review).
79. See id. (upholding Corps’ limited scope of review).
80. See Aracoma, 556 F.3d at 194 (justifying holding for limited scope of
review).
81. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 33 C.F.R. pt. 325, App. B,
§ 7(b)(1) (2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (discussing possible scope
of Corps’ jurisdiction).
82. Id. (emphasis in original removed) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting 33 C.F.R. pt. 325, App. B, § 7(b)(1) (2008)) (discussing standards and
regulations for determining possible scope of Corps’ review).
83. Id. at 194-95 (discussing need for 404 permit for entire valley-fill project).
The underdrain system is required for the safety and stability of the overall valleyfill project. Id. at 195.
84. Id. at 194-95 (discussing validity of plaintiff’s contentions).
85. Aracoma, 556 F.3d at 196 (holding that Corps’ jurisdiction is precluded by
exclusive grant of jurisdiction to WVDEP).
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sal of excess spoil[.]’”86 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit noted that the regulatory scheme the NEPA promulgated and
the Corps echoed focused on a complimentary approach to the interplay between state and federal regulatory agencies and discouraged the duplication of state agency procedures.87 The court
ultimately concluded that the Corps properly and reasonably limited the scope of its review; in addition, the court determined that
the Corps should be accorded deference in its findings on the environmental impact and mitigation of the operations.88
Much like in the Fourth Circuit cases, the Sixth Circuit, in Kentuckians for Commw. v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs (Kentuckians)89, upheld the Corps’ decision to limit its scope of review only
to the specific dredge-and-fill activities for which the coal company
requested a section 404 permit.90 The Sixth Circuit focused its reasoning in Kentuckians on many of the same factors as that of the
Fourth Circuit in Aracoma, including the Corps’ own interpretation
of its scope of review and congressional intent to limit duplicative
regulation between the EPA and the Corps.91
F. Section 404 Permits and NEPA Analysis Outside of the
Mining Context
Courts have analyzed the Corps’ issuance of section 404 permits in a variety of contexts.92 In Friends of Back Bay v. United States
86. Id. at 195 (alterations in original) (quoting Br. for the W. Va. Dep’t of
Commerce and the W. Va. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants at 13) (discussing extent of WVDEP’s required environmental review).
87. Id. at 196 (discussing discouragement of duplicative agency review).
88. Id. at 197 (noting court’s holding). The court found that the Corps impact findings were not arbitrary or capricious. Id. at 201. The court found that the
Corps was “able to ‘articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a
rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’ ” Id. at 207
(quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
43 (1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The court found that the Corps
did not act arbitrarily or capriciously when it found that the project’s cumulative
impacts would not be significantly adverse. Id. at 209.
89. 746 F.3d 698 (6th Cir. 2014).
90. Kentuckians for Commw. v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 746 F.3d
698, 698 (6th Cir. 2014) (upholding Corps’ decision to limit scope of review to
dredge-and-fill activities).
91. Id. at 708-11 (accepting Corps’ arguments for limited scope of review).
92. See generally Defenders of Wildlife v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp., 762 F.3d 374,
380 (4th Cir. 2014); see also Friends of Back Bay v. United States Army Corps of
Eng’rs, 681 F.3d 581, 583 (4th Cir. 2012) (analyzing Corps’ jurisdiction in various
construction contexts). These cases do not directly address the court’s analysis of
the Corps’ decisions to issue section 404 permits; rather, the cases present situations outside of the coal mining context where such an analysis could potentially
arise. Id.
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Army Corps of Engineers (Friends of Back Bay),93 the Fourth Circuit
analyzed the sufficiency of the Corps’ environmental review of a
proposed boat mooring facility near a national wildlife refuge.94
The Corps issued a section 404 permit to authorize “channel dredging, as well as the excavation and relocation . . . of silt and other
material.”95 “[T]he permit [also authorized] [ ] the construction of
bulkheads, piers, [and] mooring piles[.]”96
An environmental group challenged the Corps’ decision to issue the permit in Friends of Back Bay, arguing that the Corps improperly limited its scope of review.97 The District Court for the
District of Columbia deferred to the Corps’ decision to limit its
scope of review and not consider the potential harm to the refuge
from the increase in boating activity resulting from the project.98
The Fourth Circuit overturned the district court’s ruling and forced
the Corps to expand its scope of review to consider the possible
negative effects of increased motor traffic near the refuge.99 The
Fourth Circuit made no mention of any competing regulatory agencies in its decision.100 Rather, it focused its analysis on the Corps’
required scope of review.101
Although the Corps’ review was not called into question, environmental groups challenged the sufficiency of state regulatory
agencies’ review of proposed highway construction in at least one
case.102 In Defenders of Wildlife v. North Carolina Department of Transportation (Defenders of Wildlife),103 environmental groups challenged
the sufficiency of the state transportation agency’s review of a proposed bridge construction.104 In that case, the Fourth Circuit
found that the District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina improperly defined the scope of the project and the scope of
93. 681 F.3d 581 (4th Cir. 2012).
94. Friends of Back Bay v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 681 F.3d
581, 583 (4th Cir. 2012) at 583 (presenting issue on appeal).
95. Id. (discussing scope of permit and construction activities in question).
96. Id. (describing construction activities authorized by permit).
97. Id. at 586 (describing plaintiff’s complaint).
98. Id. (discussing district court’s holding).
99. Friends of Back Bay, 681 F.3d at 589 (remanding case to district court for
preparation of new EIS).
100. See id. (providing no mention of competing regulatory agencies).
101. See id. (focusing analysis on Corps’ required scope of review).
102. See Defenders of Wildlife v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp., 762 F.3d 374, 381-82
(4th Cir. 2014) (discussing claims against N.C. Department of Transportation for
insufficient review under NEPA).
103. 762 F.3d 374 (4th Cir. 2014).
104. Id. at 381 (discussing plaintiff’s suit against state regulatory agency for
violations of NEPA).
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review.105 Because the project dealt with the construction of a
bridge, which provided access to coastal barrier islands, the project
would likely invoke the Corps’ jurisdiction as well.106 Similar challenges, like those made to the Corps’ issuance of section 404 permits in the coal mining context, could potentially be made in the
context of the Defenders of Wildlife bridge construction case.107
IV. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT’S REVIEW OF
ON APPEAL

THE

CORP’S JURISDICTION

A. NEPA Violation
In OVEC, Inc., the Fourth Circuit discussed and rejected the
plaintiff’s contention that the Corps violated NEPA by failing to
consider the evidence that OVEC introduced during the public interest review period.108 The court primarily relied on its holding in
Aracoma and upheld the Corps’ decision to grant Raven Crest’s section 404 permit, despite evidence that OVEC submitted it.109 The
key factor to the court’s decision was the “elaborate, congressionally
mandated schema for the permitting of surface mining operations[.]”110 This statutory scheme places the “bulk of environmental effects associated with surface coal mining operations” under
WVDEP’s jurisdiction.111
The court found that the critical facts of OVEC, Inc. were indistinguishable from those of the Aracoma case, where the Fourth Circuit upheld the Corps’ decision to limit its scope of review to “only
the effects of the discharge of fill material into ‘the affected waters
and adjacent riparian areas.’”112 OVEC argued that its case was distinguishable from Aracoma because the activities in its case, which
105. Id. at 391 (stating that district court based its analysis on improperly defined scope of review). The court found that the district court’s analysis was based
on an “erroneously defined scope of the Project[.]” Id.
106. See id. at 381 (discussing scope and purpose of proposed bridge replacement project).
107. See Defenders of Wildlife, 762 F.3d at 381-82 (discussing scope of proposed
project that involves 2.4 miles of bridge and fifteen miles of highway traveling
through federally owned and managed natural coastal areas).
108. Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal., Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 828
F.3d 316, 318 (4th Cir. 2016) (addressing plaintiff’s arguments on appeal).
109. Id. at 321-23 (relying on precedent to uphold Corps’ decision).
110. See id. at 322-23 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Aracoma,
556 F.3d at 195) (stating reasoning behind decision to uphold trial court
decision).
111. Id. at 322-23 (arguing that requiring broader scope of review would be
inappropriate).
112. Id. at 322 (quoting Aracoma, 556 F.3d at 193) (discussing reliance on
precedent).
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the Corps authorized, involved the “mine-through” of streams, as
opposed to the overburden valley-fill activities in question in
Aracoma.113 OVEC raised this distinction as an attempt to show that
what the Corps was authorizing under its section 404 permit in the
OVEC, Inc. case was more than the mere dumping of fill material
into federally regulated U.S. waters.114 OVEC argued that the
Corps was authorizing coal mining activities as a whole.115 OVEC
reasoned that because the Corps was authorizing mining activities,
it must review the human-health effects of the mining operation
overall.116 The Fourth Circuit rejected OVEC’s attempt to distinguish Aracoma and held, in accordance with the Sixth Circuit, that
the specific activity a section 404 permit authorized cannot be coal
mining because WVDEP has exclusive authority to authorize coal
mining activities.117
OVEC further attempted to distinguish OVEC, Inc. by asserting
that the claims made in Aracoma “‘were limited to the Corps’ duty
to consider water quality impacts of the authorized valley fills and
related mining,’ whereas here[,] [in OVEC, Inc.,] [the claims] relate[d] to human health.”118 OVEC believed that such a distinction
would require the Corps to expand its review.119 According to
OVEC, while the statutory scheme provided for extensive review of
water quality impacts, it did not require the review of the humanhealth impacts of the project as a whole.120 OVEC argued that the
Fourth Circuit should require the Corps to review the humanhealth consequences of the mining project because the statutory
scheme did not require any other agency to do so.121

113. Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Engineers,
828 F.3d 316, 323 (4th Cir. 2016) (showing plaintiff’s attempt to distinguish current case from unfavorable precedent).
114. See id. (addressing plaintiff’s first argument that Corps was authorizing
more than just coal mining).
115. See id. (raising and rejecting plaintiff’s attempt to distinguish facts and
legal analysis).
116. See id. (discussing plaintiff’s second argument).
117. Id. (citing Kentuckians for the Commw. v. United States Army Corps of
Eng’rs, 746 F.3d 698, 710 (6th Cir. 2014)) (noting court’s reliance on precedent
and persuasive authority).
118. OVEC, Inc., 828 F.3d at 323 (quoting Appellants’ Br. at 33) (discussing
plaintiff’s attempts to distinguish unfavorable precedent).
119. See id. (inferring reasoning behind plaintiff’s arguments).
120. See id. (outlining conflicting regulations between CWA and SMCRA).
OVEC argued that the unfavorable holding in Aracoma was a result of existing statutory requirements addressing water quality concerns. Id.
121. See id. at 324 (discussing plaintiff’s arguments).
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The Fourth Circuit, however, rejected this distinction in OVEC,
Inc.
The court concluded that WVDEP was, in fact, required to
consider human-health effects when it issued a section 401 permit
under the CWA.123 The court subsequently found that WVDEP’s
human-health considerations would not be required to justify the
Corps’ decision to limit the Corps’ scope of review under section
404.124 The Corps’ scope of review is limited to only the specific
dredge-and-fill activities detailed in OVEC, Inc., regardless of the
specific considerations other agencies required, because the SMCRA gives “exclusive jurisdiction” to WVDEP to authorize coal mining activities.125
122

B. CWA Section 404 Violation
In OVEC, Inc., after the Fourth Circuit rejected OVEC’s claims
that the Corps violated NEPA, it turned to, and quickly rejected,
OVEC’s CWA claim.126 OVEC argued that the Corps’ own regulations required that it “consider the connection between surface
coal mining and adverse public health effects” during its review of a
section 404 permit application.127 OVEC relied on these regulations, attempting to show that the Corps’ failure to consider the
reports on the adverse human-health impacts of coal mining generally constituted a violation of section 404 of the CWA.128
OVEC addressed the Corps’ regulations that require the Corps
to reject permit applications for “discharges that will involve
‘[s]ignificantly adverse effects . . . on human health or welfare.’”129
OVEC also highlighted the Corps’ regulation that requires the
Corps to weigh the benefits of the proposed activity against its “rea122. Id. at 323-24 (rejecting plaintiff’s arguments attempting to distinguish
unfavorable precedent).
123. OVEC, Inc., 828 F.3d at 324 (providing reasoning for rejecting plaintiff’s
attempt to distinguish unfavorable precedent).
124. Id. (expanding on reasoning behind rejecting plaintiff’s distinctions).
125. Id. (stating conclusion on validity of Corps’ decision to limit scope of
review under section 404 to only specific activities related to dredging and filling of
jurisdictional waters).
126. See id. (raising and rejecting plaintiff’s argument that Corps violated
CWA section 404).
127. Id. (stating OVEC’s argument that section 404 requires public health
review).
128. See OVEC, Inc., 828 F.3d at 323-24 (discussing plaintiff’s arguments about
violation).
129. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(c) (2012)) (outlining plaintiff’s argument); see also 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(c) (2012) (providing regulatory basis for plaintiff’s argument).
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sonably foreseeable detriments.”130 The Fourth Circuit agreed that
these regulations “require the Corps to take into account the public-health effects of a proposed discharge of fill material before
granting a section 404 permit.”131 The court ultimately concluded,
however, for the same reasons it employed in its NEPA analysis, that
the Corps’ review of public-health effects was properly limited to
the proposed discharge of fill material alone.132 The court refused
to force the Corps to review impacts of coal mining generally because such a review is exclusively under WVDEP’s authority pursuant to the SMCRA.133
V. AN ANALYSIS

OF THE

FOURTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION

A. Mining Through: What is the Corps Really Authorizing?
In OVEC, Inc., the Fourth Circuit relied on binding and persuasive precedent in Aracoma and Kentuckians in order to uphold the
Corps’ decision to limit the Corps’ scope of review.134 In both of
those cases, the proposed activity requiring a section 404 permit was
the filling of streams with overburden from strip mining activities.135 In OVEC, Inc., however, the proposed activity involved the
“mining through” of streams.136 The plaintiffs did not challenge
the Corps’ decision to regulate and review the “mining through”
activity.137 Rather, they challenged only the sufficiency and scope
of the Corps’ environmental review of the activity.138 Although the
Fourth Circuit agreed that the Corps had authority to regulate the
activity of mining-through the stream, it refused to require the
130. OVEC, Inc., 828 F.3d at 323-24 (quoting 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a)(1) (2011))
(outlining plaintiff’s argument); see also 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a)(1) (2011) (providing
regulatory basis for plaintiff’s argument).
131. OVEC, Inc., 828 F.3d at 323-24 (discussing court’s concessions to plaintiff’s premises).
132. Id. at 324 (holding in favor of limited scope).
133. See id. (limiting Corps’ review).
134. For further discussion of the Fourth Circuit’s reliance on its reliance on
precedent, see supra notes 108-133 and accompanying text.
135. OVEC, Inc., 828 F.3d at 322-23 (distinguishing case from Aracoma and
Kentuckians precedent).
136. Id. at 322 (internal quotation marks omitted) (addressing plaintiff’s
arguments).
137. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (stating plaintiff’s argument that
specific activity to be regulated is “mining-through” streams).
138. Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal., Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, No.
2:12-6689, 2014 WL 4102478, at *15 (S.D.W.V. Aug. 18, 2014) (clarifying scope of
plaintiff’s complaint).
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Corps to consider the cumulative adverse impacts of coal mining
because coal mining is exclusively regulated by WVDEP.139
In the absence of WVDEP regulation, the Corps’ regulations
provide that the Corps must consider the human-health effects of
coal mining generally because such effects are “reasonably foreseeable[,]” indirect, and cumulative effects of the proposed miningthrough activities.140 The Corps’ regulations, however, also provide
guidance as to when “the Corps has control and responsibility beyond the specific regulated activity[.]”141 These regulations require
that the Corps consider two categories of factors in assessing the
scope of its jurisdiction.142 The first category encompasses two
proximate cause factors concerning the link between the specific
activity and the project as a whole.143 The second category addresses two jurisdictional factors prompting the Corps to consider
the breadth of its jurisdiction and “[t]he extent of cumulative
[f]ederal control and responsibility.”144 In OVEC, Inc., the Corps
decided to limit its scope of review of Raven Crest’s application to
“the footprint of the regulated activity within the delineated
water[ ]” because the entire project was not regulated within cumulative federal control.145
The Corps’ decision gives controlling weight to the jurisdictional factors for determining when the Corps has responsibility beyond the specifically regulated activity.146 The Fourth Circuit in
OVEC, Inc. justified the Corps’ decision by relying on the reasoning
139. See OVEC, Inc., 828 F.3d at 324 (limiting Corps’ scope of review).
140. See id. at 320-22 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Aracoma Coal Co., 556 F.3d 177, 191 (4th Cir. 2009)) (analyzing
appropriate level of Corps’ jurisdiction); see also 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8 (2011) (providing regulatory basis for jurisdictional analysis).
141. Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal., Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, No.
2:12-6689, 2014 WL 4102478, at *13 (S.D.W.V. Aug. 18, 2014) (laying out plaintiff’s
argument); see also 33 C.F.R. Pt. 325, App. B(7)(b) (1988) (providing regulations
supporting plaintiff’s argument).
142. OVEC, Inc., 828 F.3d at 321-22 (discussing Corps’ regulations).
143. Ohio Valley Entl. Coal., Inc., 2014 WL 4102478 at *14 (analyzing plaintiff’s
regulatory arguments); see also 33 C.F.R. Pt. 325, App. B(7)(b) (1988) (providing
regulatory basis for plaintiff’s argument).
144. Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal., Inc., 2014 WL 4102478 at *14 (quoting 33 C.F.R.
Pt. 325, App. B(7)(b) (1988)) (analyzing Corps’ regulations).
145. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Department of the
Army Permit Evaluation and Decision Doc. 8-9) (outlining structure of Corps’
regulations).
146. See id. (noting Corps analyzed four factors considered in determining
whether it has responsibility beyond specific regulated activity). “The Corps relied
primarily on the [jurisdictional factors], as WVDEP was responsible for the overall
permitting of coal operations pursuant to SMCRA[.]” Id.
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the Fourth Circuit used in Aracoma.147 In Aracoma, the court found
that the specific activity was “nothing more than the filling of jurisdictional waters for the purpose of creating an underdrain system
for the larger valley fill.”148 The court upheld the Corps’ permit in
Aracoma because, although it was an activity deemed to be a causal
link and a necessary requirement for the rest of the coal mining
project, the rest of the project “[fell] under the exclusive jurisdiction of [ ] WVDEP[.]”149 The court upheld the Corps’ decision to
give controlling weight to the jurisdictional factors.150
The court in Aracoma was able to limit the Corps’ required
scope of review based on a jurisdictional conflict with WVDEP because the question was whether the Corps must consider coal mining when the specific activity was only the underdrain system
related to the coal mine.151 In OVEC, Inc., however, the activity for
which the Corps issued a section 404 permit was not for the mere
filling of a stream for an underdrain system; rather, it was for the
“mining through” of federally regulated U.S. waters.152 The Fourth
Circuit’s reasoning in Aracoma for upholding the Corps’ decision
does not transfer to the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning in OVEC, Inc.
without distorting the definition of the “specific activity” in
question.153
The activity in this case, mining-through streams, is not merely
a causal link to coal mining, but is coal mining itself.154 If the “specific activity” was defined as the “mining-through” of streams, the
Corps would likely be required to review the cumulative health effects of coal mining because coal mining is the specific activity for
which the Corps had issued a permit.155 The OVEC, Inc. court per147. See OVEC, Inc., 828 F.3d at 321-24 (relying on Aracoma precedent).
148. Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Aracoma Coal Co., 556 F.3d 177, 194 (4th Cir.
2009) (distinguishing precedent).
149. Id. (limiting Corps’ scope of review on jurisdictional grounds).
150. See id. (giving controlling weight to jurisdictional limitations in Corps’
regulations).
151. See id. at 187 (describing scope of requested permit). The Aracoma permits authorized the creation of valley fills and sediment ponds. Id.
152. See OVEC, Inc., 828 F.3d at 322-23 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(analyzing scope of Corps’ review). “[T]he Corps limited its NEPA review to the
environmental impacts of the dredge-and-fill activities associated with ‘mining
through’ the streams[.]” Id. at 322.
153. See generally Aracoma, 556 F.3d at 194; see also OVEC, Inc., 828 F.3d at 323
(comparing reasoning to precedent).
154. See Evans, supra note 30, at 544 (describing activities Corps regulates).
155. See Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal., Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs,
No. 2:12-6689, 2014 WL 4102478, at *13-*15 (S.D.W.V. Aug. 18, 2014) (citing
Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 767 (2004)) (discussing environmental review required by NEPA).
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mitted the Corps to further narrow its scope of review on jurisdictional grounds by even further limiting its definition of the “specific
activity[.]”156 The Fourth Circuit used the jurisdictional basis in
Aracoma to limit the scope of review required for filling activities
and used the same basis to limit the definition of the “specific activity” in question in OVEC, Inc.157 The court in OVEC, Inc. refused to
require the Corps to consider the negative human-health effects of
coal mining when the Corps issued a permit to do the very same
thing.158
B. Filling the Gap between the Scope of the Corps’ Authority
and the Scope of Its Review
While there appears to be a gap in the OVEC, Inc. court’s logic,
the court found a compelling justification for limiting in the scope
of the Corps’ review in the statutory interplay between NEPA, the
SMCRA, and the CWA.159 The SMCRA grants exclusive jurisdiction
over the regulation of coal mining to WVDEP.160 WVDEP must review “[e]very detail” of coal mining operations under the SMCRA
permitting process.161 The Fourth Circuit in Aracoma found that
also requiring the Corps to review the cumulative impacts of coal
mining would be “at best duplicative, and, at worst, meaningless.”162
This justification for the Corps’ decision holds true whether the
specific activity in question is simply the disposal of mining overburden or actually mining through streams.163
The Corps’ regulations in OVEC, Inc., however, forced the
court to manipulate the definition of “specific activity[.]”164 There,
the Fourth Circuit had no outlet for limiting the scope of review for
156. See id. at *14 (allowing Corps to narrow definition of “specific activity”).
157. See generally Aracoma, 556 F.3d at 194; OVEC, Inc., 828 F.3d at 323 (providing justifications for limitation of scope of permit review).
158. See OVEC, Inc., 828 F.3d at 323-24 (upholding Corps decision to limit
scope of review for dredge and fill activities relating to mine-through activities).
159. See generally Aracoma, 556 F.3d at 195-96 (discussing duplicative action
justification for limiting Corps scope of review).
160. Id. at 195 (citing 30 U.S.C. § 1253 (2000)) (analyzing jurisdictional balance between Corps and WVDEP); see also 30 U.S.C. § 1253 (2000) (providing statutory support for contention).
161. See Aracoma, 556 F.3d at 195-96 (alteration in original) (quoting W. Va.
Dep’t of Commerce & W. Va. Dep’t Envtl. Prot. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants 13) (discussing scope of WVDEP’s environmental review).
162. Id. at 196 (discussing reasoning used in prior case to limit Corps’ scope
of review).
163. See generally OVEC, Inc., 828 F.3d at 316; Aracoma, 556 F.3d at 177 (providing background of Corps’ jurisdictional analysis).
164. See Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal., Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs,
No. 2:12-6689, 2014 WL 4102478, at *13 (S.D.W.V. Aug. 18, 2014) (internal quota-
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specific activities that are regulated by other federal agencies, so the
court was forced to limit its definition of “specific activity[ ]” under
the Corps’ regulations.165 This limited definition of “specific activity” forced the court to artificially separate the activity of “miningthrough” streams into two otherwise inseparable activities: 1) the
seemingly metaphysical act of coal mining generally, and 2) the act
of dredging and filling the streams through which mining activities
have taken place.166
VI. IMPACT: THE CORPS’ NARROWED DEFINITION
“SPECIFIC ACTIVITY”

OF

A. The OVEC, Inc. Decision’s Impact on Coal Mining
The Corps was able to successfully narrow its scope of review to
avoid jurisdictional overlap with WVDEP after the court’s most recent decision in OVEC, Inc.167 This new, narrowed scope and definition of “specific activity” will allow the Corps to continue issuing
permits to surface coal mine operators without needing to fully analyze the potential impacts that mining has on the environment or
human health.168 WVDEP and other similar federally-approved
state regulatory agencies may consider such impacts in most instances.169 Further investigation of potential inadequacies in
WVDEP’s environmental review process, however, may be required
to more fully understand any possible negative consequences of the
OVEC, Inc. court’s decision to limit the scope of the Corps’
review.170
At least one scholar has suggested that “state permitting authorities have ignored egregious violations of law.”171 There have
been suggestions that some “state [regulatory] agencies have [ ]
tion marks omitted) (quoting 33 C.F.R. Pt. 325, App. B(7)(b) (2013)) (justifying
Corps’ interpretation of regulations).
165. See id. at *13-*14 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 33 C.F.R.
Pt. 325, App. B(7)(b) (2013)) (justifying narrow interpretation in light of Corps’
regulations).
166. See OVEC, Inc., 828 F.3d at 322-23 (separating surface mining from fill
activities associated with surface mining involving mine-through activities).
167. See id. at 323-24 (holding that Corps’ scope is limited due to WVDEP’s
exclusive jurisdiction to authorize surface coal mining).
168. See id. (upholding WVDEP’s exclusive jurisdiction to authorize coal
mining).
169. For a further discussion of cases involving the oversight of coal mining by
state regulatory agencies, see supra notes 6565-91 and accompanying text.
170. See Evans, supra note 30, at 530 (discussing possible inadequacies in state
regulation of coal mining).
171. See id. (footnote omitted) (discussing possible insufficient review by state
regulatory agencies).
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[actually] violated the CWA [themselves].”172 If, in fact, state regulatory agencies’ review of the overall mining process is insufficient,
then the OVEC, Inc. court’s decision to limit the Corps’ scope of
review may prolong the negative effects associated with an inadequate environmental review.173 In theory, however, the court’s decision in OVEC, Inc. will serve to ensure an appropriate distribution
of authority between state and federal regulatory agencies.174 Requiring full and comprehensive review from federal and federallyapproved state regulatory agencies for the same proposed activity
would appear to be an unnecessary expenditure of national resources.175 Such an approach also appears contrary to the intentions of the cooperative federalism approach of the statutory
scheme.176
B. The Decision’s Impact in Other Corps’ Regulated Areas
The Corps’ jurisdiction to permit earth-moving activity in and
around U.S. waters is not limited to the coal mining context.177
The CWA potentially requires the Corps to issue section 404 permits for a variety of proposed construction activities.178 Thus, the
Corps’ scope of review for its permitting process is relevant to anyone who may be undertaking earth-moving activities or construction projects in or around U.S. waters.179
It is possible that this new, narrowed definition of “specific activity” will allow the Corps to limit its scope of review for other pro172. See id. (discussing instances of CWA violations by state agencies); see also
Zoë Gamble, Injustice in the Fourth Circuit: Bragg v. West Virginia Coal Association is
Moving Mountains for Industry, 30 VT. L. REV. 393, 398 (2006) (outlining political
pressures leading to substandard state regulation of coal mining).
173. See Evans, supra note 30, at 530 (providing examples of state regulatory
deficiencies). At least one scholar, however, suggests additional intervention from
the EPA could help curb the negative effects of an uninvolved Corps. See id.
174. For a further discussion of the court’s desire to limit duplicative agency
action, see supra notes 80-91 and accompanying text.
175. For a further discussion of the court’s desire to limit duplicative agency
action in order to conserve resources, see supra notes 81-91 and accompanying
text.
176. For a further discussion of the court’s desire to adhere to the statutory
scheme promoting a cooperative federalism approach, see supra notes 87-88 and
accompanying text.
177. For a further discussion of the potential areas of the Corps’ jurisdiction
outside of the mining context, see supra notes 92-107 and accompanying text.
178. For a further discussion of examples of possible areas in which the
Corps’ may have jurisdiction for various construction contexts, see supra notes 92107 and accompanying text.
179. For a further discussion of the potential impact the court’s decision to
limit the Corps’ scope of review may have generally, see supra notes 167-170 and
accompanying text.
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posed projects, in which a federally-approved state regulatory
agency’s jurisdiction is also invoked.180 The Corps’ new scope of
review could potentially allow it to skirt its responsibility of reviewing the environmental impacts of proposed construction activities
for mooring and boating facilities, or even roadway and highway
construction.181 It is most likely the case, however, that the Corps
will only be permitted to limit its scope of review when there is a
federally-approved state regulatory agency also directly responsible
for permitting major aspects of the proposed activity.182 It is also
possible that in the future, courts will limit the holding in OVEC,
Inc. to the coal mining context and will refuse to expand the implications of the OVEC, Inc. holding into other areas that require a
section 404 permit from the Corps.183
Mitchell J. Ream*
180. For a further discussion of the potential for the invocation of the Corps’
review in non-mining contexts, see supra notes 92-107 and accompanying text.
181. For a further discussion of the potential consequences of the court’s limitation of the Corp’s scope of review, see supra notes 167-170 and accompanying
text.
182. For a further discussion of the role that competing agency jurisdiction
played in the court’s decision to limit the Corps’ scope of review, see supra notes
140-150 and accompanying text.
183. For a further discussion of the instances when the Fourth Circuit required a heightened scope of NEPA analysis outside of the coal mining context,
see supra notes 92-107 and accompanying text.
* J.D. Candidate, 2018, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law,
B.S., 2015, West Virginia University.
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